R&D, Within and Between Patent Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry by Magazzini, Laura et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RA Economics and institutional change 
 
R&D, Within and Between 
Patent Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
 
 
Laura Magazzini 
Fabio Pammolli 
Massimo Riccaboni 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2279-6894   
IMT LUCCA EIC WORKING 
PAPER SERIES 03 
July 2013 
#03 
2013 
  
 
 
ISSN 2279-6894  
IMT LUCCA EIC WORKING PAPER SERIES #03/2013 
© IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca 
Piazza San Ponziano 6, 55100 Lucca 
 
Research Area 
Economics and institutional change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R&D, Within and Between 
Patent Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
Laura Magazzini 
Department of Economics, University of Verona 
 
Fabio Pammolli 
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca 
 
Massimo Riccaboni 
IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca and Department of Managerial Economics,  
Strategy and Innovation, K.U. Leuven 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R&D, Within and Between Patent Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry
Laura Magazzini∗ Fabio Pammolli† Massimo Riccaboni‡§
June 28, 2013
Abstract
We analyse the consequences of the increasing complexity of R&D on within- and
between-patent competition in the pharmaceutical industry. The intensity of competi-
tion is measured by jointly considering the timing from market launch to patent expiry,
the strength of between-patent competition as well as competition introduced by generic
producers. A simple model is proposed that predicts the shrinking of product lifetimes
in the presence of correlated parallel R&D projects and market portfolios. The model
is tested using data on pharmaceutical products sold in Europe and in the US. Based
on our model we are able to estimate the impact of R&D complexity and relatedness
among R&D portfolios on the value of innovative drugs.
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1 Introduction
The pharmaceutical industry is facing a R&D productivity crisis (Cockburn, 2006, Pammolli
et al., 2011): the costs of developing a new drug and total R&D investments have been
increasing (DiMasi et al., 1991, DiMasi et al., 2003, Adams and Van Brantner, 2006), as has
the failure rate of candidate drugs in clinical trials (Mervis, 2005, Pammolli and Riccaboni,
2008). Conversely, the number of new molecular entities launched on the market has remained
virtually flat, whereas blockbusters patent expiries has lead to a drop in sales of more than
$100bn (the so-called “patent cliff”) (Kelleher, 2009, Jack, 2012).
Although this may seem a recent industry-specific phenomenon, empirical accounts of the
returns from innovative activities have been accumulating sound evidence about the long-term
decline in the productivity of the R&D effort across sectors and countries (Griliches, 1990,
Kortum, 1993, 1997, Jones, 1995, Lanjouw et al., 2004, Jones, 2009).1 Increasing market op-
portunities, stiffer competition, and the increasing burden of knowledge are considered as the
main causes of the decline in R&D productivity (Everson, 1993, Kortum, 1993, Segerstrom,
1998, Lanjouw et al., 2004, Jones, 2009).
In this paper, we take a new look to the evolution of R&D competition and final market
dynamics in the pharmaceutical industry. Namely, we develop a comprehensive analysis to
measure the intensity of competition for innovative drugs that, besides, statutory patent life
and follow-on competition, takes into account the erosion of sales due to the entry of generic
producers after patent expiry.
In the literature, there has been many attempts to quantify the extent of innovation and
competition in the pharmacetical industry along different directions. Dranove and Meltzer
(1994) took into account the development time of new molecular entities introduced since
1950s (up to 1986) and found an increasing time lag from first international patent filing
to FDA approval. Using more recent data, DiMasi et al. (2003) show longer time from the
start of clinical testing to submission of new drug applications with the Food and Drug
1By the 1990s, the number of patents produced per US researcher had fallen to 55% of its 1970 level, with
even steeper declines in Europe (Everson, 1984, 1993). Kortum (1997) found that the number of researchers
has increased by nearly 5% each year since the beginning of the 1950s, while patents per researcher have
been diminishing.
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Administration (FDA) for compounds first tested in humans between 1983 and 1994 with
respect to previous analysis (DiMasi et al., 1991).2 The erosion of patent life induced by
longer clinical trials and the expansion of regulatory burdens have been documented by
several studies (Hutt, 1982, Andersson and Hertzmant, 1993, Dranove and Meltzer, 1994,
Abrantes Metz et al., 2004). R&D and market competion are closely related. It has been
found that he gap between the commercial introduction of a new (patented) product and
the arrival of later competitors has been shrinking (Bayus, 1998). Thus, measuring residual
market value of innovative drugs as the time-span between product launch and patent expiry
(or time to first generic entry) only provides an upper bound to effective patent value. Rather,
we should also consider the expected time until a patented product is replaced on the market.
Agarwal and Gort (2001) find that the average time-span from market launch to competitor
entry has declined from almost 33 years at the end of the 19th century to 3.4 years in 1967-
86. According to DiMasi and Paquette (2004), the time lag between the introduction of
breakthrough drug (first-in-class compounds) and follow-on new drugs has fallen from 10.2
years in the 1970s to 1.2 years in late 1990s. Mansfield (1984) reported that 60% of patents
are effectively terminated within 4 years. Accordingly, Levin et al. (1987) showed that almost
all patents are duplicated in 5 years. Working on patent renewal data in Germany, Lanjouw
et al. (2004) show that more than 50% of the patents are abandoned in ten years. Thus,
the expected value of innovative products is a function of both time-to-market and follow-on
competition. Also, after patent expiration, the time period from innovator’s market launch to
generic entry has been shrinking (Grabowski and Kyle, 2007). Besides erosion of innovators’
returns by generic competition after patent expiry (within-patent competition), competitive
forces are active during patent life too, between similar products under different patents
(between-patent competition – see Lichtenberg and Philipson, 2002).
Our goal in this paper is to integrate different measures of patent value in a unified and
coherent framework. First, we set the boundary of the in-patent market regime for between-
patent competition by measuring the residual patent life of pharmaceutical products, i.e.
2However, the effect is counterbalanced by a decrease in the timing of FDA approval associated with the
implementation of the 1992 Prescription Drug Use Fee Act (DiMasi et al., 2003).
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the timing from market launch to the end of statutory patent life. Second, we analyse the
competition induced by follow-on competitors and generic producers. As in Lichtenberg and
Philipson (2002), we consider two dimensions: (i) the timing of entry, and (ii) the sales
erosion conditionally upon entry.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we account for the patterns of within
and between-patent competition both in Europe and the US, whereas the previous literature
focuses on the US. Second, we identify the key drivers of the the timing and intensity of
market competition in the pharmaceutical industry. Based on our estimates, we quantify
the impact of different regimes in terms of composition of R&D portfolio on the intensity of
market competition.
Our findings have some relevant policy implications on the current debate on the disclosure
of clinical trials data in Europe and the US (Rodwin and Abramson, 2012). Based on our
results, we show that by increasing the correlation of R&D portfolio, holding complexity
constant, competition is increased with an implied reduction in the value of innovative drugs.
By granting full access to clinical trial results, we expect an increase in the relatedness of
R&D projects, and the value of innovative drugs is reduced up to 14%, of which 10% is due
to decrease of between-patent competition, before the patent expires. The effect is found to
be larger in the US with respect to European countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a simple model of the relationship
between R&D complexity, competition and the value of innovative pharmaceutical products.
Section 3 illustrates data and methodological approach. Section 4 tests the predictions of
our model in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. The final Section concludes.
2 R&D and market competition in the pharmaceutical
industry
The degree of competition between innovative drugs is influenced by a differentiated set of
factors. On the one hand, R&D complexity and the growing burden of knowledge induces
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longer gestation lags before market approval. On the other hand, the strength and intensity
of follow-on market competition (both by new patented drugs and generic producers) can
substantially reduce the market value of patented drugs. In this respect, the extent and
strength of patent protection play a central role in protecting innovators’ returns.
In this section, we take a broader view to analyse the combined effect of R&D complex-
ity, market competition and patent breadth. We measure the extent of competition as the
effective patent life (EPL) of innovative products taking into account the duration of clinical
trials as well as sales erosion caused by the entry of in-patent and off-patent competitors.
We analyse market portfolios of R&D projects which would emerge under competition
among rival research units (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). As in Cabral (1993), we assume
that the process of getting a new product into the market consists essentially of two stages:
(1) the R&D race to discover and patent a new product candidate, and (2) a testing phase,
such as clinical trials for pharmaceuticals, to have the product approved for marketing. At
the end of the R&D race, successful firms patent their product candidate and decide whether
to move it into the trial phase. Thus, patent coverage lasts T years from the beginning of
the trial phase (set at t = 0). Clinical trials are required before the regulatory authority
approves marketing of new drugs. Clearly, a product launched after L years of trials has a
residual patent life of T − L years.
The outcome of clinical trils can be represented as a stochastic process, due to strong
uncertainty about safety and effectiveness of drugs in humans.3. Specifically, clinical trials
are modelled as Poisson processes with instantaneous probability of success λ. We consider
a technology space consisting of k independent R&D trajectories (Sutton, 1998) or lines of
research (Aghion et al., 2008). In the first stage, a firm must choose an R&D trajectory.
When firms opt for different R&D trajectories, R&D market portfolios are totally uncorre-
lated. However, firms may be working along the same R&D trajectory, developing chemically
related drug candidates (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987, Sutton, 1998). Along the same R&D
trajectory, patented products are allowed to share some features (but not all) depending on
the extent of patent coverage. Thus, more firms can follow the same research trajectory by
3Sutton (1998) described it as a “lottery game”.
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partially differentiating product characteristics, that is to say, they can develop analogous
products.
We assume that products have a finite number of features n, to be tested. Thus, if two
analogous products share m features, they will have the same probability of success in m < n
trials. In such a simple stochastic set-up, the patent market exclusivity period (i.e., the time
until an innovative product experience competitor’s entry) is of random duration: it starts
at product launch (Li) and ends whenever rival firms launch a patented drug on the same
market (Li+1) (between-patent competition), or the patent expires (T < Li+1) and generic
drugs are allowed to enter (within-patent competition).
With perfect patent protection, analogous products are ruled out and there is no between-
patent competition, so that the residual patent life is simply given by the difference between
the patent term and the duration of the testing phase.
In case of between-patent competition, the strength of between-patent competition is
related to the the expected time until a patented product is replaced in the market or,
more precisely, the patented product inter-arrival time (O’Donoghue et al., 1998). In this
framework, “the winner takes all” hypothesis corresponds to the case in which the probability
of success in the testing phase is so low compared with the patent length that there is no
chance of between-patent competition and/or there is perfect patent breadth and firms choose
different R&D trajectories. In such a case, there are no overlapping patent terms and each
product has a temporary monopoly on the final market. A firm starts the trial phase at time
t = 0. The firm payoff s is negative in each period before product launch s = −c, where c is
the R&D cost per unit of time in the trial phase, and positive after product launch: s = v.
In the post-launch patent exclusivity regime, the firm captures the per-period benefit of the
innovation (v) until patent expiry (T ) and 0 afterwards. With a single R&D trajectory, the
expected duration of the trial phase is L = 1/λ, and a firm will start the trial phase if the
expected payoff of undertaking trials is positive: v(T − L)− cL > 0 or
v/c >
1
λT − 1
(1)
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Since T > L the ratio on the left is always positive.4
The more alternative and equally plausible research trajectories there are, the lower the
instantaneous probability of success λ/k. In the case of k > 1, equation (1) becomes:
v/c >
k
λT − k
(2)
Thus, ceteris paribus, if R&D complexity increases due to the proliferation of research
trajectories (higher k) or increasing difficulties in the testing phase (lower λ), the expected
number of new product launches will decrease.5 We may conclude that increasing R&D
complexity (higher k) implies longer clinical trials and therefore a contraction of the residual
patent life.
When we measure competition by looking at residual patent life, we assume that full
market exclusivity is enjoyed from market launch to the end of the period of patent pro-
tection, implicitly only allowing competition by generic producers. Instead, between-patent
competition is substantial, causing an erosion of innovator’s sales, well before patent expiry
(Lichtenberg and Philipson, 2002, DiMasi and Paquette, 2004).
We now consider the most interesting case in which more than one company enters the
testing phase (parallel R&D) and may compete in the final market (between-patent compe-
tition). In this case, the probability of success of different R&D projects may be statistically
independent if firms decide to move to the testing phase along different R&D trajectories.
Conversely, firms which choose the same lines of research may have correlated R&D portfolios.
Let us start with the case of perfect patent protection (thus, firms follow different R&D
4For u competing products, the patent exclusivity condition implies that
v/c <
u
λT − 1
thus, in case of coexisting products, each taking the same share of total value v, the expected payoff turns
negative. This is the classic incentive failure which the patent system is meant to address. In this case, the
patent proscribes innovation and guarantees innovators the full net social return on R&D expenditures.
5In the case of a discount rate r > 0, if we define τ = 1−e−(r+λ/k)T and η(T ) = (1−erT )/r, the expected
payoff becomes:
EPV = η(T )v −
(c+ v)τ
r + λ/k
As T goes from 0 to infinity, τ ranges from 0 to 1 and may be seen as the “normalized” expected patent
length.
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trajectories). Let Li be the arrival time of the patented product i on the market and Li+1
be the arrival time of the follow-on product. Since trials are Poisson processes with the
same instantaneous probability of success λ, then it is well-known that inter-arrival times are
independent and exponentially distributed with mean L = 1/λ. Therefore, in the markets
where the arrival of follow-on competitors is expeced before patent expiry, we might observe
overlapping patent terms and between-patent competition. Conditional upon successful in-
novation, the payoff depends on the number of products competing in the same market.
For the sake of simplicity, we can assume that if J firms are simultaneously present with a
patented product in a given market, each obtain an equal share s = v/J of payoff v.6
With parallel R&D and independent research projects an increase in the number of tra-
jectories k will shift the expected launch date of each product, thus reducing the expected
payoff. However, the proliferation of R&D trajectories will delay the expected arrival of
follow-up products from Li to kLi for all candidate products. Late-comers and firms which
spent too much time in the first phases of the R&D process will be selected out whereas,
conditional upon entry, products will have a longer residual patent lifes. Thus, we can state
that, Ceteris paribus, in a high λ regime and perfect patent protection, an increase in the
number of R&D trajectories k implies an increase of the time before the arrival of follow-on
competitors.
Lastly, let us consider the case of markets with correlated parallel R&D projects (patent
breadth is not perfect). At the beginning of the R&D race, firms choose the R&D trajectory
and the features of their candidate drugs. With imperfect patent protection, firms can choose
the same lines of research and share a fraction m < n of product features. In the trial phase,
each of the n product features is tested. Each test has a given instantaneous probability of
success λn. Since the sum of two independent Poisson processes is still a Poisson process,
the expected probability of arrival of two products which share properties are correlated
6This is equivalent to saying that, if the patent has perfect breadth and more firms make the discovery,
they have the same probability of obtaining the patent. If innovation is drastic and occurs in a homogeneously
good market with linear demand function P (Q) = aQ, by normalizing post-innovation marginal costs to 0,
the aggregate output will be Q = γa, with γ ranging from 1/2 (perfect collusion) to 1 (Bertrand competition)
(Denicolo and Franzoni, 2003). Thus, profits with J competing firms will be s(J) = 1J γ(1− γ)a
2 ≤ v/J with
v = a2/4. Here we consider the upper limit s = v/J .
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(Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987).7
When products share 0 < β ≤ 1 of their features, the expected inter-arrival time between
the first and second product is (1− β)nL, which corresponds to the conditional probability
of success of the second product, given that the first one has been successful. Conditional
upon first arrival, increasing levels of product relatedness (β) can counterbalance the growth
of k. As demonstrated by Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), in “the winner takes all” scenario
and two-point distributions, the R&D market portfolio consists of projects which are too
highly correlated. Cabral (1993) shows that the result holds even if we relax “the winner
takes all” condition. Correlated R&D projects will arise in case of ex ante uncertainty (i.e.,
about the outcomes of the trial phase) and/or when firm’s products are substitutes, and
firms can avoid pure price competition by collusive or Cournot solutions as well as non-price
competition through first mover advantages and marketing expenditures. When c = 0, firms
will be indifferent about the value of β, however, for positive c, each firm will prefer correlated
R&D projects. Summing up, in a high λ regime, with 0 < β ≤ 1 and high R&D complexity
(high k) firms will select correlated R&D projects and between-patent competition will be
stiffer, due to R&D correlation (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987).
All in all, the proliferation of research trajectories (k) implies longer trials and patent
inter-arrival times. Conversely, the presence of correlated R&D projects reduces the time
between the arrival of patented products. The increasing burden of knowledge, in the presence
of imperfect patent protection and R&D spillovers, should thus reduce the market value of
innovative products.
Since new products developing along the same R&D trajectories are imperfect substitutes
(like analogous drug candidates) they do not completely displace pre-existing ones. Hence,
in our empirical analysis, we consider the effect of between-patent competition in terms of
product market share turnover, weighting the time from market launch to the end of the
statutory life of the patent according to the market share left after the entry of follow-on
7Let us consider, as an example, the case in which two firms develop a product with two features, of which
one is in common: P1 = (A,B) and P2 = (A,C). Next, they both move into the testing phase. In the first
(second) stage, feature one (two) is tested. If trials are independent Poisson processes with rates λa, λb and λc,
then L1 and L2 are Poisson processes with rates λa+λb and λa+λc, and Cov(A+B,A+C) = V ar(A) = λa,
so that the correlation coefficient of the two products is given by λa/
√
(λa + λb)(λa + λc).
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products competing in the same market. In addition, the level of competition induced by
generic producer after patent expiry is analysed.
3 Data and Methods
Our empirical investigation is based on the PHarmaceutical Industry Database (PHID) main-
tained at IMT Lucca, Italy. PHID combines several sector-specific proprietary datasets con-
cerning R&D activity, collaborations and final drug markets, with data from public sources,
as well as companies, confidential information, and press releases. As a result, the database
provides a unique source for studying the innovative activities and patterns of competition,
both on the R&D side and on the market, faced by private actors and public institutions in
the pharmaceutical industry.
In our analysis we consider products launched in the US and the EU-15 countries. For
each compound, the database track country-specific patent information (including the date
of patent filing and patent expiry), the scientific publications related to the compound,9 and
the evolution of market sales from July 1996 to June 2008 in EU-15 countries and the United
States.10
The analysis will take into account the timing of within- and between-patent competition,
as well as their intensity. In particular, we study the time of exposure to generic producers,
first by making the simplifying assumption that generic entry occurs at patent expiration
(that is, we analyse how R&D complexity and parallel R&D affect the drug development
process and therefore the time from market launch to the end of statutory patent life), and
then by taking into account the hazard of entry and sales erosion by generic producers. In
order to characterize between-patent competition, we first rely on a survival analysis that
explore the determinants of the time span from market launch to follow-on competition.
9Information about scientific publications was extracted from PubMed, a service of the US National
Library of Medicine, including over 18 million citations from MEDLINE and other life science journals for
biomedical articles from 1948. See <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/>.
10Sales data are measured in both value and quantity together with information about the 4th digit Anatom-
ical Therapeutic Classification (ATC4), the corporation which holds marketing rights to the compound, the
launch date, and the compounds(s) involved.
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Next, we investigate the patterns of sales erosion from branded competitors. Finally, the
competition induced by generic producers at patent expiry is taken into account.
As a first step to our analysis, it is essential to devise a definition of the relevant market
in which products are substitutes to treat a given pathology. In the analysis of between-
patent competition, we define the market according to the 4-digit Anatomical Therapeutic
Classification (ATC4), grouping together compounds targeted to the same pathology and
exploiting the same mechanism of action (Danzon and Furukawa, 2006).11 Instead, a finer
level is considered for the analysis of within-patent competition, which typically occurs at
the level of specific compounds. Therefore, generic substitution by products with the same
compound is considered.
3.1 Timing and intensity of competition
In order to characterize the dynamics of between- and within-patent competition, we take
into account both (i) the timing from market launch to the entry of follow-on competition,
and the timing from market launch to the entry of generic producers; (ii) the intensity of
competition as characterized by sales erosion conditional on entry.
Survival analysis is employed to study the factors affecting the residual patent life, as
well as time to follow-on and generic entry. To measure the intensity of between-patent
competition, we rely on a simple model of technological substitution, in which penetration
of the new technology is expressed as a (non-decreasing) function of time (starting from the
11The Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) groups drug products on the basis of the therapy,
with the anatomy as the main organizing theme. The classification is hierarchical and, at the first digit,
compounds are grouped according to the organ or system on which they act; at the second digit, classes
are formed according to their pharmacological and therapeutic action. The third digit groups together all
compounds with the same therapeutic and pharmacological characteristics, whereas, at the fourth digit,
also chemical characteristics are considered. For example, at the first digit, class A refers to compounds
targeted to the alimentary tract and to metabolism with drugs used to treat acid related disorders classified
in A02. The third digit further distinguishes between antiacids (A02A), drugs for peptic ulcer and gastro-
oesophageal reflux disease (A02B), and other drugs for acid related disorders (A02X). At the fourth digit, class
A02B further distinguishes H2-receptor antagonists, prostaglandins, proton pump inhibitors, combinations
for eradication of Helicobacter pylori, and other drugs for peptic ulcer and gastro-oesophageal reflux disease.
As an example, an analysis of competition dynamics in the class of H2-receptor antagonists is reported in
Berndt et al. (1995). With few exceptions, also in the analysis of follow-on drug development undertaken by
DiMasi and Paquette (2004), the therapeutic class is identified on the basis of ATC4. The four-digit markets
are thus a more accurate level to analyse product competition.
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time when the following in-patent competitor enters the market) (Fisher and Pry, 1971).
Let s(1, t) be the market share of the innovator at time t and s(2, t) the market share
of competing (follow-on) technology. We set at t = 0 the time when the period of market
exclusivity for the innovator product ends with the entry of the next in-patent compounds.12
Penetration is measured as a function of the (log) ratio q(t) = s(2, t)/s(1, t), and it is assumed
to evolve as the following function of time (Fisher and Pry, 1971):
ln[si(2, t)/si(1, t)] = θ0i + θ1it+ uit (3)
with θ1i measuring the erosion of product i due to follower entry (entry of product i + 1).
The higher the value of the estimated θ1i, the faster the erosion of sales due to follow-on
competition.13
The regression results are then exploited to devise a measure of market exclusivity which
appropriately accounts for the level and patterns of between-patent competition following
the entry of competitors’ products. That is, we value each month from product launch to
patent expiry on the basis of expected market competition. We assign the value 1 to every
month before the entry of the next in-patent competitor, and then the value of one additional
month of patent life is weighted on the basis of the intensity of competition. The measure of
market exclusivity (in-patent) is defined as follows:
MEin =
T−L1∑
t=1
D(t < L2 − L1) +D(t ≥ L2 − L1)P
(
1
1 + qˆt
)
with L1 and L2, respectively, the time of entry of the innovator and the time of entry of the
next follow-on competitors, T the statutory patent life,14 qˆt = exp(θˆ0 + θˆ1t), D(z) = 1 if z is
true, and P (a) = pe × a+ (1− pe) with pe equal to the probability of experiencing follow-on
competition.
12As the two compounds belong to the same market, it is assumed that they compete for the treatment of
the same pathology, i.e., they are substitutes.
13The coefficient θ1i will be written as a function of product and market characteristics.
14As a result, T − L1 represents the residual patent life after the innovator’s launch, and L2 − L1 is the
interarrival time before follow-on competition.
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So far, we made the simplifying assumption that at patent expiration generic producers
enter the market fostering Bertrand competition and driving down prices to marginal costs.
However, this might not be the case and the value of the patent extends beyond patent expiry
(Hudson, 2000). Thus, in order to consider a measure of market exclusivity that also takes
into account post-expiry dynamics, we take into account the timing and intensity of generic
competition. Analogously, using the Fisher-Pry set up, we study the penetration dynamics
of generic products as compared to branded products after patent expiration:
ln[sm(G, t)/sm(B, t)] = θ
G
0m + θ
G
1mt+ ut (4)
where sm(G, t) represents the total sales of generic producers, sm(B, t) represents the total
sales of branded products in market (molecule) m. Time is measured in quarters from the
year of patent expiry. The higher the value of the estimated θG1m, the faster the erosion of
branded sales due to generic entry.
By combining the in-patent and off-patent periods, we define the following measure of
market exclusivity (in- and off-patent, total):
MEtot = MEin +
120∑
τ=1
P
(
1
1 + qˆτ
)
× PG
(
1
1 + qˆGt
)
(5)
with qˆτ = exp(θˆ0 + θˆ1(T − L1 + τ)), qˆ
G
τ
= exp(θˆG0 + θˆ
G
1 τ), P (a) = pe × a + (1 − pe) with pe
equal to the probability of experiencing follow-on competition, and PG(a) = pG×a+(1−pG)
with pG equal to the probability of experiencing generic competition.
15 MEtot is thus equal
to MEin plus the value accruing after patent expiration.
3.2 Measuring R&D complexity and parallel R&D
For each drug development project, PHID monitors both the therapeutic market toward
which the compound is targeted and the biological mechanisms of action of the drug can-
15A fixed time frame of 10 years (120 months) after patent expiration is considered. We also experimented
using different time frame with no difference in the results.
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didates.16 A number of important trends have fundamentally reshaped the pharmaceutical
industry in the past thirty years, strengthening the interactions between basic science and
product development, with advances in physiology, pharmacology, enzymology, cell biology
and later molecular biology strongly affecting the evolution of technology (Gambardella,
1995, Henderson et al., 1999, Pammolli et al., 2011). The connectedness of drug development
to its scientific underpinnings has increased the range of scientific opportunities available
to players in the industry, leading to a proliferation of alternative approaches for targeting
the same pathology (Drews, 2000, Hopkins and Groom, 2002, Drews, 2003, Overington et
al., 2006). We claim that the larger the number of available approaches, the more complex
is the research surrounding the pathology, as a clear path for the treatment has still to be
identified. Accordingly, the level of R&D complexity k is proxied by the (log) number of the
differing biological targets which are considered by R&D projects in the preclinical stage.17
We also exploit the information developed with the help of a pharmacologist, aimed at
describing and assessing disease complexity.18 The evaluation is based on several parameters
such as outcome (whether lethal if therapy is not provided), any organ damage or complica-
tion, the etiology (distinguishing multifactorial etiology, monofactorial etiology, and diseases
with unknown etiology). We argue that the complexity of the disease is higher for lethal
diseases or diseases causing complications and organ damages, as well as for diseases with
unknown or multifactorial etiology (Pammolli et al., 2011).19
We devise a measure of product similarity (β) based on the content of scientific publica-
tions and patents. If two compounds are jointly mentioned in a scientific publication, they
should share some features. Thus, we measure β by looking at co-occurrences in publica-
tions. In particular, we define a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least one publication
in which the innovator compound is mentioned together with compound(s) available within
16As an example, for the treatment of glaucoma, various approaches have been pursued including
prostaglandin agonist, 5HT antagonist, alpha adrenergic agonist. PHID allows us to distinguish compounds
using the different research approaches. The information is available for different therapeutic indications.
17Indeed, in our data, markets in which a higher number of biological mechanisms is explored are also
characterized by a lower probability of success.
18The main source for disease information was Braunwald et al. (2001). We also drew information from
e-medicine reviews in the disease database at the <http://www.diseasedatabase.com>.
19In some specification of the model, we also include dummy variables that identify ATC1 classes in order
to check robustness of the estimated coefficients.
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the same market (ATC4). Ad hoc queries were performed in PubMed in order to select
publications mentioning the compounds included in our analysis.20
We also considered information in patent citations and build on the idea, well-established
in the literature, that if patent A cites patent B, it means that patent A contains a piece
of knowledge patent B is building upon, leading us to claim that the two patents need to
share some features (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002, Fontana et al., 2009). A dummy variable
is considered, equal 1 if the innovator compound cites previous patents in the same market
(ATC4).
On the basis of our model, we expect a negative effect of these variables on the time span
between innovator launch and competitor entry.21
DiMasi and Paquette (2004) show that later entrants tend to enter the market sooner (that
is, the time from first-in-class to the second follow-on drug is longer than the timing from
the second to the third follow-on drug). Accordingly, the order of entry of each compound
(computed according to observed entry for all the time periods available) is also included in
the regressions of between-patent competition.22
3.3 Additional control variables
We consider additional variables as controls in the analysis of R&D and market competition.
Since it has been shown that concentrated and smaller markets attract lower entries (Ace-
moglu and Linn, 2004), market size is taken into account to control for the attractiveness of
different market opportunities. Moreover, market concentration at the time when the inno-
vator compound was launched (as defined by the Herfindahl index of concentration at ATC4
level) and the market share of the innovative firm within the same ATC4 before launch of the
new product are added to the regressions to control for market power and experience, respec-
tively. The pre-launch market share of the innovator is also included, to take into account
the possibility of a deterrent effect, where the fear of costly litigation leads to distortions
20Data were updated to September 2008.
21These two variables are obviously not included in the analysis of within-patent competition, as there is
complete correspondence between the molecule in the branded products and that in generic drugs.
22Also this variable is not included in the analysis of within-patent competition.
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in the pattern of innovative investments. Available evidence shows that this is indeed the
case for smaller firms (Lerner, 1995). Analogously, the share of self-citations to the innovator
patent is considered as a proxy for appropriability of the research trajectory underlying the
development of the product. The higher the share of self-citations a patent receives, the
stronger the competitive position of the firm/institution in that particular technology (Hall
et al., 2000). Therefore, slower entry by competitors is expected, i.e., the expected sign of
this variable is positive.
A description of the variables included in the analysis is provided in Table 1.
**** TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ****
4 Competition in the pharmaceutical industry
Before turning to the analysis of between- and within-patent competition, we characterize the
dynamics of drug development process, and the corresponding period of patent coverage of
innovative compounds. The life of pharmaceutical patents can be decomposed in two periods:
(a) the time from patent filing to market launch (i.e. the timing of product development and
clinical testing); (b) the time from market launch to the end of statutory patent life (see
Figure 1). For every compound, our database report both the launch date and the date of
patent filing and expiry (including patent extensions, if any) at the country level. Accordingly,
country-specific information are taken into account.23 In Figure 1 we distinguish products
launched before 1990, products launched in the 1990s and products launched in 2000 or
later.24
**** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ****
Figure 1 shows that the timing from patent filing to market launch is increasing over time,
with a corresponding decrease in the residual patent life (and therefore, faster exposure to the
23If the same compound is launched in two different countries, it is treated as two (not independent) records
in the dataset.
24The duration analysis presented in Section 4 (Tables 2 and 4) only considers products launched over the
period 1993-2007, that is 6,644 country-products. For some analysis (e.g. results in Figure 1) we extend our
dataset to include compounds launched before 1993 (10,757 country-products).
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competition by generic producers).25 All differences over time are statistically significant at
the 5 percent level, with the exception of the time of compound R&D in the US for product
launched over 1990-99 as compared to 2000-08. All in all, Figure 1 provides evidence of a
decrease in residual patent life driven by an increase in the timing of product development.
Table 2 reports the results of a survival analysis in which the dependent variable is the
time (months) from product launch to patent expiry in each country. Among the independent
variables, the number of biological targets is used to proxy R&D complexity, together with
dummy variables for disease characteristics. Country fixed effects (Country Dummies) and
time dummies are included in all specifications.
**** TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ****
Consistent with theoretical predictions, the number of R&D trajectories negatively af-
fects the timing from product launch to patent expiration. The result holds true when the
variables describing the disease characteristics and market dummies are included in the anal-
ysis. The coefficients for the measures of disease complexity (that is, whether lethal, causing
organ damage or complications, and the etiology) are broadly coherent with predictions: the
coefficient for lethal diseases is negative, but it lacks statistical significance; patents protect-
ing drugs that may cause organ damage or complications record lower residual patent life;
patents associated to drug targeted to diseases with monofactorial etiology exhibit longer
residual patent life. The order of entry has a positive effect; however, this is not statistically
significant when market dummies are included in the regression.
We next consider the analysis of the expected time between product arrivals, as measured
by the time lag (in months) between the launch of each product and the entry of the next
25Note that, for the US, our estimates of the residual patent life for products launched before the year 1989
are coherent with data provided by Dranove and Meltzer (1994). For more recent times, DiMasi et al. (2003)
reports a total time of about 11.9 years from initial synthesis of a compound to FDA approval, therefore
including human clinical trial, preclinical and the discovery stage. However, comparison with our results is
complicated by the fact that pharmaceutical firms apply for patent protection during the preclinical stage
(Danzon et al., 2007). Still, we get longer estimates of successful completion than DiMasi et al. (2003), and
the difference might be due to the different set of organizations included in the analysis (DiMasi et al., 2003
only consider data from large pharmaceutical firms, whereas both large and small organizations are included
in our analysis).
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in-patent in the same market (ATC4).26
Table 3 reports the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the share of innovators enjoying market
exclusivity after selected years from launch. Matching the results of Mansfield (1984), we
find that about 1/2 of patents undergo competition by substitute products within 4 years.
This share increases to 70% when we consider a time-span of 10 years from innovator launch.
We run a set of regressions to understand the role of R&D complexity and product similarity
on market exclusivity (see Table 4).
**** TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE ****
The regression model takes into account the time between market entry and the launch of
the next in-patent competitor in the same market. Country and time dummies are included
in all specifications.
**** TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE ****
The variable identifying project relatedness (both in patents and scientific publications)
has a negative and statistically significant effect: more similar products experience faster en-
try, providing support to our theoretical predictions. Consistently with DiMasi and Paquette
(2004) the order of entry has a negative and statistically significant effect.
Estimated Models 3-5 also include in the regressions the measure of R&D complexity and
additional controls. The number of R&D trajectories has a positive effect on the time lag
to follow-on entry, but the coefficient is only marginally significant, when market controls
are included in the analysis (Model 5). Products targeted to diseases causing organ damage
or complications experience slower entry of follow-on competitors, whereas, when diseases
with monofactorial etiology are considered, the entry of follow-on competitors is faster. Sign
of the estimated coefficients are broadly consistent with our predictions in Proposition 2,
that is, lower R&D complexity leads to faster entry of follow-on competitors. In most cases,
26We analyse the time span between pairs of subsequent launches in the same ATC4, referring to the
innovator as the first product in the pair and the follower as the second one entering the market. The first
product need not be the first compound launched in the ATC4, but may have been considered a “follower”
in another pair.
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statistical testing fails to reject the null hypothesis that the single coefficient is equal to zero;
however, coefficients are jointly statistically significant in Model 5.27
The market and firm control variables introduced in Model 5 have the expected sign,
although they are not statistically significant.
Overall, correlation of R&D portfolios play a significant role in the pharmaceutical indus-
try, leading to a shrinkage of market exclusivity times. Conversely, milder support is provided
to the prediction that increasing R&D complexity lead to a longer market exclusivity time,
however this prediction holds only when there is no R&D correlation. Even if the coefficients
of the “R&D complexity” variable have the expected sign, they are jointly significant at the
1% level only in Model 5.
The interarrival time only provides a partial picture of the intensity of between-patent
competition, and it is important also to analyse sales erosion spanning from follow-on prod-
ucts. Analysis is carried out by relying on the model of technological substitution proposed
by Fisher and Pry (1971).
As described in the previous section, let s(1, t) be the market share of the innovator
at time t and s(2, t) the market share of competing (follow-on) technology.28 The time
t = 0 corresponds to the entry of the next in-patent compounds. Quarterly sales data are
available, so time is measured in quarters from the follower launch. Penetration is measured
as a function of the ratio q(t) = s(2, t)/s(1, t).
As a preliminary descriptive account of the main dynamics characterizing between-patent
competition (in terms of sales and pricing strategy), Figure 2 shows the median values of
sales (value and quantity) and price ratios for each product in our database, together with
40th and 60th percentiles.
**** FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ****
27The p-value of the joint test undertaken on the “complexity” variables (R&D trajectories, lethal, organ
damage, complications, and monofactorial etiology) is less than 5%.
28As sales and price figures were only available from July 1996, the sample is further reduced and now only
comprises products launched over the time period covered by the sales data. In addition, only products for
which the entry of a substitute in-patent compounds was actually observed can be considered in the analysis.
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We find evidence of a strong first mover advantage. After about twenty quarters (five
years) from the launch of the competing product (j = 2), the median ratio between sales
market share of the follower and the older innovator is about 0.7 for sales values (0.6 for
quantities sold). In our model, we examined the upper bound of equal market shares for
the old innovative compound and the new one. Empirically, in most cases, the younger
innovation never reaches the sales value of the original innovator, consistent with evidence of
brand loyalty within the pharmaceutical field (Scherer and Ross, 1990, Schmalensee, 1982,
Sutton, 1998).
The median values of the price ratios show that the follower price is higher than the
price charged by the innovator, also explaining the lower penetration when quantities are
considered. The result is consistent with the model of Perloff et al. (1996), in which the price
of a competing product may be above the price under market exclusivity in a wide range of
cases (both collusive behavior and Bertrand competition).
Result of the Fisher-Pry regression (3) are reported in Table 5. A fixed effect panel
data model is employed for estimation. The coefficient θ1i is written as a linear function of
compound and market characteristics. As these are fixed over time for each product, it is not
possible to identify the effect of those variables on the average of the dependent variable (that
is, whether these variables affect θ0i), however it is possible to identify whether penetration
dynamics (as captured by θ1i) are different on the basis of those observable characteristics of
the compounds and of the market.29 Besides the variables used in the survival analysis, we
include the age of the compound in the regressions, in order to test whether sales erosion has
become faster over time. The higher the value of the estimated θ1i, the faster the erosion of
sales due to follow-on competition. The introduction of the interaction terms between t and
product/market characteristics allows us to assess the variables that significantly affect the
penetration dynamics.
**** TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE ****
29This is accomplished by including in the model interactions between t and the variables of interest.
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According to our estimates, younger products experience faster erosion: the coefficient
of the interaction between t and product age (t×Product age) is negative, and statically
significant. Also, drugs targeted to markets with a larger number of R&D trajectories expe-
rience slower sales erosion. As for the correlation of projects, products citing previous patents
experience faster sales erosion, whereas no significant effect is detected when correlation is
measured trough co-occurrence in scientific publications. Finally, erosion is faster in larger
markets.
4.1 Generic competition and post-patent expiry dynamics
We now analyze off-patent competition between generic producers and branded (patented)
products,30 looking both at the time span from patent expiry to first generic entry and
whether the pattern of generic penetration has changed over time.31
Figure 3 reports the hazard function of the time to generic entry from the year of patent
expiry. Compounds are grouped on the basis of the year of patent expiry,32 and we show
that the entry of generic producer is becoming faster over time (Grabowski and Kyle, 2007).
Products whose patent has expired after the year 2000 are more likely to experience generic
entry soon after patent expiration as compared to products whose patent has expired in the
previous time period.
**** FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ****
Table 6 reports the estimates of a survival model, where the dependent variable is the
time from patent expiry to generic entry, and we consider the effect of the disease dummies
and market characteristics at the time of patent expiration.33
**** TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE ****
30When we referring to generic products, we are considering unbranded generics. PHID does not allow us
to identify branded generic products.
31In this section, the relevant market is defined grouping compounds with the same molecular entity.
32We restrict our analysis to molecules with patent expiry over the years 1993-2007. The set of compounds
considered in the analysis is therefore different from the one in previous section, in which we were taking into
account innovator products launched over the same time period.
33A Weibull survival distribution has been considered for the analysis.
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Results show that generic entry is faster (the time from patent expiry to generic entry
is shorter) in larger and more concentrated markets, whereas the reverse is true for lethal
diseases, as well as diseases causing permanent organ damage and with monofactorial etiol-
ogy. However, the effects of the disease dummies is not robust to the inclusion of the market
(ATC1) dummy variables, with the exception of compounds targeted to diseases with mono-
factorial etiology. Besides time to generic entry, it is important to analyse the erosion of sales
spanning from generic competition.
Analogously to the study of between-patent competition, we rely on the Fisher-Pry model
to study the penetration dynamics of generic products. Figure 4 shows the median ratio of
generic sales to branded sales after patent expiry. After about 5 years, the ratio of generic
sales to branded sales equals 1/2, that is generic products hold about one-third of total
market sales. Price competition is substantial, with price of generic products being about 75
percent of the average price of branded products.
**** FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ****
Table 7 reports the results of the estimate of the Fisher-Pry regression for the case of
generic producers, as in equation (4). The higher the value of the estimated θG1m, the faster
the erosion of branded sales due to generic entry. In this regression we consider the interaction
between the years since patent expiry and t,34 trying to understand whether younger products
experience faster sales erosion by generic producers (see also Grabowski and Kyle, 2007). We
also include the interaction with disease and market characteristics considered in the previous
regression.
**** TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE ****
Conditional on entry, the erosion of sales of branded products due to the entry of generic
producers is substantial, and it is faster for products experiencing patent expiry in more
34Again, all regressions include interactions between t and country dummies to allow for different dynamics
at the country level.
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recent years. As for the disease and market characteristics, these have a limited impact on
sales erosion.35
All in all, our results indicate stronger competition due to generic entry in the recent
years.
4.2 The role of complexity and parallel R&D
Building on the estimates obtained in the previous sections, we compute the predicted market
exclusivity time according to the different definitions proposed in this paper, and highlight
the differences between the US and EU-15 countries.
Table 8 reports the computed value of residual patent residual patent life (RPL), and
market exclusivity considering the period before patent expiry (MEin) and including com-
petition by generic producers (MEtot). RPL and the time from innovator entry and follow
on competition have been computed according to the Models estimated in Table 2 and Ta-
ble 4 (respectively, Model 2 and Model 3 have been considered in the computations). Sales
erosion from between- and within-patent competition has been computed on the basis of the
Fisher-Pry regressions reported in Table 5 (Model 4) and Table 6 (Model 2). We considered
average values for all the variables included in the regressions, and changed the level of R&D
complexity (trough the number of trajectories and the share of lethal diseases), and R&D
correlation (baseline, corresponding to the average value of R&D correlation in patents and
publications; full correlation both in patents and publications; no correlation nor in patents
neither in publications).
Results show that by increasing R&D complexity, the RPL decreases, as well as MEin.
On the contrary, an increase in MEtot is observed, as the result of decreasing competition by
generic producers.
The level of correlation of compounds has an effect on market exclusivity: higher correla-
tion implies shorter interarrival times between the innovator and the follow on competitors,
therefore reducing MEin and MEout. In particular, setting full correlation of R&D com-
35Conditional on entry. However these variables have an impact on the timing of generic entry (see Table
6).
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pounds decreases the value of innovative drugs of about 14% when all countries included in
the analysis are considered. Of this figure, 10% is due to decrease of between-patent compe-
tition, before the patent expires. The result has implications on the current debate on the
disclosure of clinical trials data in Europe and the US. By fully disclosing clinical trial results,
an increase in the correlation of R&D project portfolio is expected, implying changes in the
pattern of competition and therefore in the value of innovative drugs. The effect is found to
be stronger for the US with respect to European countries. Also, by comparing the values of
MEin andMEout for the United States and Europe, we observe a higher competition induced
by generic producers in the United States as compared to Europe after patent expiration.
5 Concluding remarks
The role of patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry is largely debated searching for
a balance between incentives to R&D, market contestability and competition.
In this paper we develop a simple model to examine the effect of increasing R&D complex-
ity and correlation of R&D portfolio on market turnover. We predict the erosion of market
exclusivity times and shrinking of product lifetimes in the presence of parallel R&D and
correlated R&D market portfolios. The model is tested exploiting a comprehensive dataset
on innovative activities and market sales in major European countries and the US.
After the completion of the human genome project, there has been a sharp increase in
the number of potential targets for new cures. Given that unexplored new targets had to
be validated (or discarded), the proliferation of R&D trajectories has lead to longer R&D
trials in the first place, thus reducing the market life of pharmaceutical patents. Since all
companies experience the same negative shock in R&D productivity, the arrival of follow-on
products should also be delayed. Counterbalancing this effect, the presence of correlation in
project portfolios, as measured through co-occurrence in scientific publications and patent
citations, translates into shorter periods of market exclusivity. In face of increasing R&D
uncertainty, firms tend to focus on a subset of research trajectories, thus selecting correlated
R&D projects.
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Overall, our results show that increased R&D complexity and relatedness among com-
pounds increase competition, thus reducing the value accruing to innovative drugs.
The analysis reveals interesting differences in the patterns of competition in Europe vis-
a´-vis the US. First, the residual patent life is longer in the US than in Europe. This might
explain by longer clinical trials in the US or by delayed launches in the European countries.
When between-patent competition is considered, the value of innovative compounds is similar
in Europe and the US, leading us to claim that sales erosion due to follow-on competition
is stronger in the US as compared to Europe. Also, when the competition in the off-patent
segment of the market is taken into account, the value of innovative products is higher in
Europe than in the US, due to the stronger competition introduced in the US by generic
producers at patent expiration.
Increasing competition has two opposite effect on residual patent life and total value, as
increasing R&D complexity reduces residual patent life and increases the value of innovative
drugs, especially when the off-patent market is taken into account.
This paper also contributes to the recent debate on the potential consequences of dis-
closing full information of clinical trials, which is undergoing both in Europe and in the US.
While it is unclear whether disclosing clinical trial results would affect the probability of
success in drug development, our analysis reveals that it has strong implications on the value
innovative drugs. The increased information that would become available on the features
of investigational compounds would push correlation of R&D portfolios, thus reducing the
value of innovative compounds. The effect would be stronger in the US than in Europe.
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Between-patent Within-patent
competition competition
Standard Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
R&D trajectories 4.422 .7175 – –
Lethal .3037 .4599 .2331 .4228
Organ damage .5710 .4950 .6351 .4815
Complications .0882 .2836 .0998 .2998
Monofactorial Etiology .0673 .2505 .0272 .1628
R&D correlation .7313 .4433 – –
Order of entry 2.717 2.127 – –
Concentration .0771 .1684 .0588 .2092
Market size (log) 6.411 3.431 5.411 3.172
Experience .0226 .1085 – –
Self-citations .2092 .3146 – –
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis of between- and
within-patent competition
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2000−08
1990−99
All      before 1989
2000−08
1990−99
EU−15    before 1989
2000−08
1990−99
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Figure 1: Decomposition of patent life: (a) from patent filing to market launch; (b) from
market launch to patent expiry, by year of product launch.
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
R&D trajectories -.0457** -.0495*** -.0486**
(.0182) (.0182) (.0201)
Lethal -.0241 -.0286 -.0369
(.0521) (.0535) (.0521)
Organ damage -.0876* -.0850* -.0825*
(.0480) (.0497) (.0455)
Complications -.1479*** -.1487*** -.1160**
(.0514) (.0522) (.0468)
Monofactorial etiology .0868** .0881** .1378***
(.0371) (.0378) (.0425)
Order of entry .0105** .0063
(.0042) (.0041)
Constant 5.148*** 5.119*** 5.036***
(.0908) (.0940) (.1006)
Time Dummies yes*** yes*** yes***
Country Dummies yes*** yes*** yes***
Market Dummies no no yes***
σ .3351*** .3367*** .3245***
(.0159) (.0156) (.0149)
κ 1.652*** 1.632*** 1.691***
(.0792) (.0767) (.0773)
Log lik -4606.6 -4596.1 -4481.8
N 6,644 6,644 6,644
AIC 9287.2 9268.1 9065.6
Robust standard errors in brackets.
(adjusted for clustering at market level).
Statistical significance: *** 1%; ** 5%; *10%
Table 2: Survival analysis: time from product launch to patent expiry; Gamma hazard
function.
percentage of products
still under
Time-span market exclusivity
1 year 77.19
4 years 46.01
8 years 31.50
10 years 27.49
Table 3: Survival function estimates (Kaplan-Meier): percentage of products still under
market exclusivity at selected time-span from innovator launch.
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
R&D correlation -1.052*** -.9255*** -.9479*** -.9369*** -.9615***
(publ.) (.1460) (.1458) (.1082) (.1387) (.1696)
R&D correlation -.5841*** -.5409*** -.5312*** -.5201*** -.5110***
(patents) (.1104) (.1112) (.1082) (.1069) (.1339)
Order of entry -.1171*** -.1122*** -.0811*** -.1194***
(.0276) (.0284) (.0278) (.0321)
R&D Trajectories .0897 .0889 .1914**
(.0824) (.0878) (.0962)
Lethal .1027 -.0420 -.0077
(.2285) (.2445) (.3068)
Organ damage .3842* .0793 .4585
(.2016) (.2286) (.2905)
Complications .7540** .6521* .7978**
(.3044) (.3162) (.3911)
Monofactorial etiology -.2551 -.2984 -.3656
(.2133) (.2216) (.2367)
Concentration .2311
(.2372)
Size (log) -.0004
(.0206)
Experience .1935
(.3583)
Self-cits. .0678
(.2064)
Constant 4.303*** 4.786*** 4.098*** 4.351*** 3.852***
(.2830) (.3373) (.5540) (.5970) (.6259)
Time Dummies yes*** yes*** yes*** yes** yes***
Country Dummies yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes**
Market Dummies no no no yes*** no
σ 1.575*** 1.566*** 1.555*** 1.538*** 1.567***
(.0242) (.0375) (.0386) (.0406) (.0491)
Log-lik -9,591.6 -9,542.9 -9502.5 -9427.4 -6681.9
AIC 19,249.2 19,153.8 19,083.1 18,958.8 13,447.7
N 6,644 6,644 6,644 6,644 4,942
Robust standard errors in brackets (adjusted for clustering at the market level).
*** statistically significant at 1% level; **at 5%; * at 10%
Table 4: Survival analysis: time from innovator launch to follower entry; Log-Normal hazard
function.
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Figure 2: Sales (value) of follower / sales of first innovator.
.
00
1
.
00
2
.
00
3
.
00
4
.
00
5
0 20 40 60 80 100
time to generic entry (months)
1993−1999
2000−2007
 
Figure 3: Hazard of generic entry after patent expiry, compounds grouped on the basis of
the year of patent expiry
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variable (value) (value) (value) (value) (value) (quantity)
t .0434*** .0877*** .0743*** .0991*** .1278*** .1188***
(.0102) (.0146) (.0194) (.0254) (.0351) (.0335)
t×Product age -.0039*** -.0031*** -.0026** -.0063*** -.0069**
(.0009) (.0011) (.0012) (.0019) (.0019)
t×R&D correl. (publ.) -.0032 .0034 .0145 .0139
(.0073) (.0081) (.0105) (.0104)
t×R&D correl. (patents) .0192*** .0207*** .0155** .0199***
(.0058) (.0060) (.0074) (.0074)
t×Order of entry .0025 .0031 .0014 .0017
(.0021) (.0022) (.0026) (.0026)
t×R&D Trajectories -.0103** -.0125** -.0101**
(.0047) (.0052) (.0051)
t×Lethal .0176 .0111 .0041
(.0135) (.0196) (.0185)
t×Organ damage .0134 .0073 .0011
(.0122) (.0194) (.0178)
t×Complications .0119 .0066 .0062
(.0135) (.0197) (.0184)
t×Monofactorial etiology .0247** .0153 .0223*
(.0107) (.0115) (.0117)
t×Concentration -.0214 -.0170
(.0226) (.0232)
t×Size (log) .0021* .0027**
(.0013) (.0013)
t×Experience .0377 .0263
(.0239) (.0239)
t×Self-cits. .0061 .0119
(.0089) (.0090)
Constant -1.385*** -1.408*** -1.405*** -1.421*** -1.401*** -1.421***
(.0289) (.0283) (.0293) (.0293) (.0315) (.0312)
Note: All regressions include interactions between t and country dummies.
Table 5: Result of the Fisher-Pry regression; sales erosion from between-patent competition.
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Lethal .8545*** .6038*** -.1207
(.1863) (.2102) (.2177)
Organ damage .8621*** .6235*** -.1234
(.1737) (.1992) (.2034)
Complications .4764** .2368 .0711
(.2037) (.2385) (.2280)
Monofactorial etiology .7655** .7617** 1.018***
(.3326) (.3483) (.3433)
Size (log) -.5588*** -.5782***
(.0307) (.0301)
Concentration (HHI) -.4579*** -.4539***
(.1529) (.1472)
Constant 4.6735*** 9.5390*** 10.371***
(.2459) (.4327) (.4610)
Time Dummies yes*** yes*** yes***
Country Dummies yes*** yes*** yes***
Market (ATC1) Dummies no no yes***
p .8211*** .8611*** .9291***
(.0247) (.0281) (.0298)
Log lik. -3296.7 -2322.6 -2133.4
N 3835 3259 3259
AIC 6663.4 4713.1 4362.7
Table 6: Time from patent expiry to generic entry, Weibull survival function.
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Figure 4: Penetration of generic producers and pricing strategy: sales value, quantity and
prices (line: median; dotted lines: 40-th and 60-th percentiles)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variable (value) (value) (value) (value) (quantity)
t .0756*** .1285*** .1627*** .0895** .1706***
(.0155) (.0235) (.0278) (.0437) (.0381)
t×Years since patent expiry -.0062*** -.0075*** -.0072*** -.0087***
(.0020) (.0023) (.0024) (.0023)
t×Lethal -.0047 .0023 -.0121
(.0200) (.0207) (.0232)
t×Organ damage -.0285** -.0229 -.0279*
(.0143) (.0151) (.0163)
t×Complication -.0313** -.0257 -.0352**
(.0153) (.0159) (.0166)
t×Monof.etiology .0181 .0284 .0324*
(.0188) (.0186) (.0175)
t×Size (log) .0063 .0038
(.0040) (.0029)
t×Concentration -.0058 .0031
(.0162) (.0155)
Constant -2.939*** -2.965*** -2.923*** -2.946*** -2.648***
(.0570) (.0607) (.0645) (.0655) (.0637)
All regressions include interactions between t and country dummies.
Table 7: Result of the Fisher-Pry regression, sales erosion from within-patent competition
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R&D correlation
baseline no correl. full correl. baseline no correl. full correl. baseline no correl. full correl.
R&D trajectories United States Europe All countries
baseline RPL 117.09 117.09 117.09 112.09 112.09 112.09 112.40 112.40 112.40
(mean) MEin 103.03 117.00 90.80 102.03 111.55 92.37 102.09 111.90 92.27
MEtot 149.89 182.67 128.54 163.18 191.10 141.21 162.35 190.57 140.42
low RPL 118.86 118.86 118.86 113.79 113.79 113.79 114.10 114.10 114.10
(1st quartile) MEin 103.04 117.49 90.70 102.70 113.18 92.72 102.73 113.45 92.59
MEtot 148.17 181.19 127.59 161.72 190.87 139.98 160.88 190.26 139.20
high RPL 114.40 114.40 114.40 109.52 109.52 109.52 109.82 109.82 109.82
(3rd quartile) MEin 101.98 114.00 90.96 100.97 109.20 92.06 101.03 109.50 91.99
MEtot 151.79 183.42 130.39 165.35 191.37 143.51 164.50 190.87 142.69
Lethal RPL 114.80 114.80 114.80 109.91 109.91 109.91 110.21 110.21 110.21
diseases MEin 101.16 114.00 87.95 100.60 109.33 89.98 100.63 109.63 89.85
MEtot 145.70 181.49 124.42 158.06 190.10 135.75 157.29 189.56 135.04
Table 8: Predicted values of RPL, MEin, and MEtot for different values of R&D complexity and project correlation.
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